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1. Introduction 
This article analyzes the Europarties’ procedures for 
the selection of Spitzenkandidaten in the 2014 Europe-
an Parliament (EP) elections. In the run-up to these 
elections, Europarties organized internal selections to 
determine their candidate for the presidency of the Eu-
ropean Commission (EC). According to Sartori (1976, p. 
64), the selection of candidates is the core activity that 
distinguishes parties from other political organizations. 
The 2014 elections can therefore be considered a 
landmark in the history of these supranational organi-
zations: the more loosely organized European party 
federations have developed towards fully-fledged Eu-
roparties with their own internal decision-making pro-
cedures and the role they play in the EP elections. 
Moreover, it also meant a landmark for the EP elec-
tions as the Spitzenkandidaten made the 2014 cam-
paign different from previous ones. For the very first 
time leading candidates with an official mandate from 
the Europarties campaigned and debated on behalf of 
and between their respective political families on a Eu-
ropean Union (EU) wide scale. A vote in these EP elec-
tions therefore also became a choice for the next EC 
president (Hobolt, 2014). 
For scholars of EU party politics, these selection 
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procedures form an interesting and unique research 
opportunity. First, the nomination of Spitzenkandi-
daten is the first political recruitment process that fully 
takes place at the European level. Since there is no EU-
wide transnational constituency for the EP elections, 
candidate selection is traditionally organized by the na-
tional member parties while the members of the EC are 
appointed by their national governments (Wonka, 
2007). Therefore, existing rules and mechanisms of 
elite recruitment at the EU level are still strongly influ-
enced by national considerations and dominated by na-
tional political actors. Second, as it is the first time that 
Europarties organized these selection procedures, it 
would seem that their party elites started with a blank 
slate designing them. Self-evidently, these party organi-
zations historically developed their own decision-making 
processes with, for instance, varying degrees of centrali-
zation and unanimity requirements. The main research 
question of this contribution is, then: to what extent is 
the design of novel candidate selection procedures of 
Spitzenkandidaten affected by existing intraparty deci-
sion-making procedures of Europarties? 
This article aims to answer this question by analyz-
ing the selection procedures for Spitzenkandidaten of 
five Europarties: the European People’s Party (EPP), 
the Party of European Socialists (PES), the Alliance of 
Liberals and Democrats for Europe Party (ALDE), the 
European Green Party (EGP), and the Party of the Eu-
ropean Left (EL). As such, we follow a comparative ap-
proach, focusing on five party cases operating in the 
same complex EU institutional environment, but with 
different decision-making procedures and possible out-
comes. The nature, course and outcome of their pro-
cedures will be examined using the seminal theoretical 
framework on intra-party candidate selection devel-
oped by Hazan and Rahat (2010). Party scholars have 
developed these frameworks focusing on national par-
ties’ procedures. In this article these theories will be 
adapted to supranational party organizations that op-
erate at the level of the EU. 
Europarties’ selection procedures for Spitzenkandi-
daten will be analyzed on the basis of party documents 
(statutes, regulations) and semi-structured interviews 
with members of the various party elites. Two waves of 
interviews took place: the first during the parties’ cam-
paigns and selection processes preceding the elections, 
and the second wave four months after the elections 
to make a hindsight evaluation of the applied selection 
procedures. Respondents were selected based on their 
involvement in the design and implementation of these 
candidate selection procedures (see Appendix). 
The article is structured as follows. The next section 
first presents the central theoretical framework by Ha-
zan and Rahat (2010) for the analysis of candidate se-
lection procedures, and discusses its applicability to the 
case of the Europarties. Afterwards, we examine the 
Europarties’ existing decision-making practices by re-
viewing earlier literature on the internal organization 
of Europarties. With regard to other forms of political 
recruitment at the EU level, it was already mentioned 
that both the selection of MEP candidates as well as 
the appointment of European Commissioners is orga-
nized by national political actors. We argue that the se-
lection of Spitzenkandidaten is relatively groundbreak-
ing as it is the first form of political recruitment 
organized at the EU level. At the end of the section on 
political recruitment in the EU, we formulate a number 
of hypotheses on the expected differences in selection 
procedures among Europarties. Subsequently, the em-
pirical section of this article analyzes and compares the 
Europarties’ candidate selection procedures based on 
the analysis of party regulations and elite interviews. 
The conclusion puts the findings of this study in theo-
retical perspective. 
2. Trespassing the Secret Garden: A Theoretical 
Framework for Candidate Selection 
Party organizations bear the huge responsibility of 
nominating a set of competent and skilled candidates 
for parliamentary office. The quality of selected candi-
dates directly determines the quality and strength of 
legislative assemblies and can, more generally, even af-
fect the stability of representative democracies (Gal-
lagher & Marsh, 1988). Therefore, it is not surprising 
that party scholars have produced a great deal of liter-
ature on this crucial function of party organizations. 
From a theoretical point of view, the study of intra-
party candidate selection is interesting for a variety of 
reasons. First, the nature of selection procedures offers 
one of the best instances to observe the distribution of 
power within the parties. After all, “he who can make 
the nominations is the owner of the party” (Schatt-
schneider, 1942). As a result, authors often analyze 
these intraparty procedures to determine the true par-
ty elite or dominant faction at a given moment in time 
(Harmel & Janda, 1994).  
Second, candidate selection is one of the main in-
struments for parties to enforce party discipline and 
control the legislative behavior of MPs (Bowler, Farrell, 
& Katz, 1999; Hazan & Rahat, 2006; Shomer, 2009). 
Since incumbent MPs rely on the party selectorate for 
reselection, they will be inclined to appease the party 
elite and toe the party line. This mechanism allows par-
ties to reward loyalty or punish defection, for example 
by MPs who are building a personal reputation through 
personal vote-seeking behavior. 
Third and lastly, the nature of candidate selection 
procedures has far-reaching consequences for crucial 
dimensions of representative democracy, such as intra-
party competition, representativeness of candidate 
lists, participation levels of members and voters, and 
legislators’ party responsiveness (Hazan & Rahat, 
2010). It has been demonstrated, for example, that 
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some selection procedures lead to more representative 
candidate lists than others (Rahat, Hazan, & Katz, 
2008). Some authors even argue that more inclusive 
participation enhances competitiveness (Cross, 1996), 
but this has not always been empirically confirmed 
(Kenig, 2009). 
The seminal framework for comparative analysis of 
candidate selection procedures has been developed by 
Hazan and Rahat (2010). Their model disentangles four 
dimensions of candidate selection: candidacy, party se-
lectorate, decentralization, and voting/appointment 
systems. Candidacy refers to who is entitled to be se-
lected by the party. Aspirant candidates do not only 
need to demonstrate their eligibility through party loy-
alty and affiliation, but are usually expected to fulfill 
additional requirements as well (Kenig, 2009, p. 440). 
The degree of party inclusiveness can be evaluated by 
analyzing restrictions on candidacies. On the inclusive-
ness pole of the candidacy continuum, all citizens are 
allowed to put forward their candidacy. On the more 
exclusive end, some additional requirements may be 
added apart from mere eligibility. Examples of addi-
tional requirements are the need to pay a fee, to gath-
er a fixed number of signatures, or to gain the support 
of an exclusive intra-party elite (Kenig, 2009, p. 440). 
The party selectorate refers to a body that selects 
candidates. Rahat and Hazan (2001) propose a selec-
torate continuum where, at the one extreme the selec-
torate is composed of only one person, and at the oppo-
site extreme it is constituted by the entire electorate. In 
this way, the continuum ranges from most exclusive se-
lectorates to most inclusive ones. In between both ex-
tremes, various bodies might have the task to select the 
party leader: the party elite, a parliamentary party 
group, a selected party agency, or party members. 
The dimension of decentralization refers to the in-
fluence of regional or local party branches in the can-
didate selection process. Political parties might have 
highly centralized candidate selection procedures, 
where the national party level has full control over 
candidate nomination. The opposite scenario is when 
local party organizations dominate candidate selection 
without any form of national intervention.  
The fourth and final dimension deals with the vot-
ing or appointment procedure. Voting procedures ob-
viously refer to systems where party candidates are 
nominated on the basis of a vote by the selectorate. 
Within a voting system, representation control is re-
duced as the party has less control over the outcome 
of the vote, and thus upon the person that will be cho-
sen as candidate-designate of the party. Appointment 
procedures, on the contrary, are said to enhance rep-
resentation control: the party wields greater control 
over the decision of the person it will put forward to 
represent the party (Rahat & Hazan, 2001, p. 307). 
The literature on candidate selection procedures 
has so far concentrated on national parties and their 
procedures. Is it possible to apply this analytical 
framework, which has largely been developed for na-
tional party organizations, to Europarties? How should 
the four dimensions of Hazan and Rahat’s model be 
translated to the context of EU level party organiza-
tions? Arguably, some differences between national 
and European party organizations should be taken into 
account before this framework can be applied to the 
EU level. The actual threshold for being a candidate to 
lead the EC, for instance, will for obvious reasons be 
considerably higher than for being nominated as a 
candidate for national (or European) legislative elec-
tions. While there is only one candidate for the Com-
mission presidency for each political family, a party or-
ganization usually has a lot of candidates when it 
comes to national legislative elections. From this point 
of view, the Europarty candidate selection procedures 
for the EC presidency are more comparable to intra-
party selection procedures for party president (or state 
president) rather than for members of parliament. 
The selectorate dimension can be applied in a com-
parable way as with national candidate selection proce-
dures. Decision-making could, in theory, be limited to se-
lected and non-selected party agencies, or might involve 
more inclusive selectorates such as delegate confer-
ences or even party members. However, Europarties do 
not have members in the same way as national party or-
ganizations do: membership to individual party mem-
bers of the various national member parties is only given 
in an indirect way. In fact, national parties are first and 
foremost the members of Europarties, not individuals 
(Hertner, 2014). This makes it practically more difficult 
to address these individual members and organize very 
inclusive selection processes such as primaries. 
Concerning decentralization, Europarties are not 
characterized by the same spatial organization as na-
tional parties, which often have various subnational 
party branches (regional, local) with varying degrees of 
importance and competences in decision-making. For 
Europarties, national member parties represent the 
party on the ground (Bardi, 2002), and the level of de-
centralization should be measured by the influence of 
these ‘sub-European’ party branches in the Europar-
ties’ candidate selection procedures. Finally, voting and 
appointment systems relate to how and on the basis of 
what type of majorities these parties take decisions. 
This dimension can be applied in a similar manner to 
European party organizations. 
3. Decision-Making Processes within Europarties 
Answering the main research question of this article 
not only requires a concise analytical framework for 
the analysis of candidate selection procedures, but also 
an in-depth knowledge of the existing decision-making 
practices of Europarties. Existing research on European 
party federations deals with their historical develop-
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ment, gradual enlargement towards new member par-
ties and the relationship of these extra-parliamentary 
party organizations with the more important EP par-
liamentary groups. Only relatively recently, authors 
have shifted their focus to the comparative analysis of 
their organizational structures (Bardi, 2002; Gagatek, 
2008; Hanley, 2008; Johansson & Zervakis, 2002). 
The reasons for this delayed attention may be re-
lated to the subordinate character of party federations 
compared to EP parliamentary groups, which already 
started playing an important role since the first EP 
elections in 1979. Compared to these institutionalized, 
integrated and well-organized party groups, European 
party federations were organizationally weak (Hix, 
2001). Moreover, these federations only have indirect 
links with civil society through their member parties. 
This has long been an excuse for scholars to ignore the 
formal structure and organizational aspects of party 
federations. 
Since their foundation in the 1970s, the four largest 
party federations have become more integrated organ-
izations with increasingly transnational characteristics 
(Pridham & Pridham, 1981; Van Hecke, 2010). The cul-
mination point of this evolution is of course the new 
appointment system for the EC presidency, where eve-
ry party federation organizes its own internal candidate 
selection process. In sum, Europarties are gaining rele-
vance and the EU institutional model is becoming more 
partisan in nature, which makes the systematic exami-
nation of these party organizations more worthwhile. 
As their institutional environments are very similar, one 
could expect that the organizational structures of Euro-
parties look very similar and evolve in a comparable 
manner. However, differing ideological backgrounds, or-
ganizational culture and decision-making practices may 
lead to differences in the organizational life of these 
transnational party families (Gagatek, 2008). 
The available literature does not provide too many 
leads on the relation between ideological party family 
and organizational nature. In their review of party 
family typologies, Mair and Mudde (1998) disentangle 
four criteria by which party families could be catego-
rized. While it was briefly mentioned that parties could 
also be compared in terms of their organization struc-
tures, their criteria only refer to the origin, policy and 
ideology, name, and transnational membership. In his 
classic work on the organization of political parties, Du-
verger (1954) was the first to argue that ideological par-
ty groups differ from each other in terms of their organi-
zational nature. More specifically, socialist and social 
democratic parties would be more inclined to adopt cen-
tralized structures than their Christian democratic coun-
terparts, who are known to give greater leeway for the 
existence of internal factions (Gagatek, 2008). 
Based on Duverger’s longstanding claim, we expect 
transnational party federations, who organize them-
selves according to party families or familles spirituelles 
(Von Beyme, 1985), to have different traditions in terms 
of their organizational nature and decision-making prac-
tices. The question, then, is whether these differences 
also become apparent in the nature of Europarties’ can-
didate selection procedures. In the remainder of this 
section, these organizational differences will be dis-
cussed based on an examination of Europarties’ deci-
sion-making procedures. Specifically, we examine to 
what extent these procedures could be labeled as trans-
national or intergovernmental. A suitable indicator to 
answer this question would be the applied majority and 
voting systems. Analogous to decision-making in the EU 
institutional model, some intraparty decisions might be 
taken on the basis of simple, absolute or qualified major-
ities, while others require unanimity. 
While Hix and Lord (1997) argue that parties usually 
take decisions based on general consensus, organiza-
tion practice reveals substantial differences in voting 
procedures. The PES seems to have a unanimity tradi-
tion in decision-making (Gagatek, 2008). Only if general 
consensus seems impossible, PES will start working 
with qualified majorities to take political decisions. Ad-
ditionally, if member parties had substantial formal 
reservations with regard to the outcome, the possibil-
ity to ‘opt-out’ of the decision could be applied, which 
was frequently used in all sorts of manifestos and polit-
ical declarations (Hix & Lesse, 2002). According to Ga-
gatek (2008), the opting-out procedure is still incorpo-
rated in PES statutes, but has recently not been used 
very frequently. 
Analogous to their Socialist counterpart, the Liberal 
party federation also has the culture of working towards 
general consensus in decision-making. The ALDE has 
been very preoccupied with organizational reforms to 
achieve greater party cohesion and consolidation (Sand-
strom, 2001). When ELDR, the forerunner of ALDE, was 
founded in 1976, it could immediately be called a feder-
ative party where decisions were taken with a qualified 
majority, and from 1991 onwards even with only a sim-
ple majority. However, there has always been a strong 
consensus culture in order to keep the highly diverse set 
of Liberal member parties aboard (Smith, 2014). 
The European Greens, united by the EGP, are a third 
example of a strong unanimity based party model (Van 
De Walle, 2001). This party federation seems to work 
with less centralized party organs, but at the same time 
applies very strict qualified majority principles and, pref-
erably, unanimous decision-making (Bardi, 2002). Based 
on the existing theories and literature on Green political 
parties, one might expect that the EGP would actually be 
the organizational outlier among Europarties. Green par-
ties usually seek to establish grass-roots party organiza-
tions with principles of basic democracy (Müller-
Rommel, 1989). But while some characteristics of this 
party type are present in EGP (e.g. rotation principle, no 
cumulation of offices), Van De Walle (2001) argues that 
the influence of the European institutional environment 
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is actually larger than the influence of typical ecological 
party culture. Moreover, the Green parties’ anti-
bureaucratic and decentralized approach has made 
them reluctant to give up national sovereignty in order 
to become more transnationalized (Dietz, 2000). 
The same applies to the EL. The party subscribes to 
the rotation principle, emphasizes its popular basis, 
and brings gender equality into practice (50% share of 
women in all organs), but whereas (former) communist 
parties are traditionally highly centralized, their Euro-
pean party lacks integration (Hudson, 2012). One could 
even call the EL ‘intergovernmental’ (Hanley, 2008, p. 
147), as national parties remain sovereign. In terms of 
voting, every member party is equal, irrespective of its 
size at the national level or its number of MEPs. 
Of the five European party federations under con-
sideration, the EPP is the actual outlier in terms of or-
ganizational characteristics. Compared to the other Eu-
roparties, the transnational character of the federation 
with the largest EP party group is considerably more 
outspoken. As early as the 1980s, the EPP identified 
the unanimity rule as the main factor hindering trans-
national development. Their statutes do not state any-
thing about unanimity requirements, which points to a 
more integrated party structure compared to its com-
petitors. Additionally, the EPP does not allow for opt-
ing-out of decision-making by any of the member par-
ties or party actors (Gagatek, 2008). 
A potential explanation for these differences in de-
cision-making is the degree of intraparty homogeneity 
at the time of the parties’ foundation. At first, EPP con-
sisted of traditional, pro-European Christian democrat-
ic parties and had a considerably easier time coming to 
agreements on electoral manifestos compared to its 
competitors. There was a strong convergence in the 
way these parties thought of political integration in Eu-
rope, which directly influenced their ideas on further 
party integration (Pridham & Pridham, 1981). Even after 
the enlargement that brought on board more conserva-
tive member parties, the party continued that tradition 
and applied more integrative voting procedures. 
The Liberal and Socialist party federations had con-
siderably less internal cohesion at the start, which 
translated into giving greater importance to the una-
nimity principle. The Liberal party federation had been 
struggling to overcome internal dissent as early as the 
1970s (Sandstrom, 2001). The CSPEC, forerunner of the 
PES, had considerably more difficulties in agreeing on 
electoral manifestos than the EPP (Gagatek, 2008). Fi-
nally, while it is often claimed that the Green party 
federation did not develop consolidated party struc-
tures compared to other Europarties (Bardi, 1994; 
Bardi, 1996; Jansen, 1996), they actually did succeed in 
building a more integrative and transnational party or-
ganization (Dietz, 2000). The strong heterogeneity in 
policy preferences of their member parties, however, 
continues to hinder decision-making on the basis of 
majority principles rather than unanimity. The latter al-
so applies to the EL, a party that is characterized by a 
wide range of opinions and attitudes (Hanley, 2008). 
This paper examines the extent to which the Euro-
parties’ new candidate selection procedures—designed 
for the selection of EC presidency candidates—are af-
fected by these existing decision-making practices. At 
this point, two elements required to answer the main 
research question have been discussed: the analytical 
framework on candidate selection, and Europarties’ 
organizational practices. A combination of these two 
building blocks allows us to formulate a number of 
testable hypotheses for each of the candidate selection 
dimensions. In terms of candidacy, the reviewed litera-
ture does not give any reason to expect substantial dif-
ferences between the Europarties: 
H1. The candidacy requirements of Europarties do 
not significantly differ from one another. 
With regard to the inclusiveness of the selectorate, we 
already mentioned that green parties generally have a 
stronger tendency to apply democratic internal proce-
dures than other party families. Therefore, we hypoth-
esize that: 
H2. The selectorate of the EGP will be more 
inclusive than the selectorates in the other 
Europarties’ selection procedures. 
The literature review revealed that the green party fed-
eration also stands out in terms of intraparty decentrali-
zation, in the sense that their party organs are less cen-
tralized compared to the other Europarties. As a result: 
H3. The candidate selection procedure of the EGP 
will be more decentralized than the other 
Europarties’ procedures. 
Finally, the voting or appointment procedures of Euro-
parties have received the largest amount of research 
attention. For this fourth dimension, the literature re-
view shows that the EPP is the deviant case compared 
to the other Europarties, as they apply the unanimity 
rule considerably less in intra-party decision-making. In-
deed, while the EPP has a strong tradition of majoritari-
an voting procedures, the other Europarties are strongly 
oriented towards decision-making by consensus: 
H4. While the candidate selection procedure of the 
EPP uses a voting procedure, the other Europarties 
apply appointment procedures.  
4. The Europarties’ Candidate Selection Procedures 
for Spitzenkandidaten 
Although the idea that Europarties should present their 
candidates for the EC presidency dates back to at least 
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2008 (Gagatek, 2009; Hix, 2008, pp. 155-163), the first 
time it was applied on a large scale was in the run-up 
to the EP elections of May 2014. In other words, Euro-
parties engaged in nominating their own candidate 
through different selection procedures. 
In its resolution of November 22, 2012, the Europe-
an Parliament urged the Europarties to nominate can-
didates for the EC presidency and stressed that they 
should play a leading role in the EU electoral campaign 
(European Parliament, 2012). In March 2013, the EC al-
so announced its recommendation for Europarties to 
nominate candidates. This was part of the Commis-
sion’s strategy to get citizens more involved in EU deci-
sion-making and to increase the visibility and personal 
character of European elections. Designing candidate 
selection procedures which are democratic, for exam-
ple, would raise the legitimacy of European institutions 
in general, and of Europarties in particular (European 
Commission, 2013). Indeed, some authors have argued 
that increasing intraparty democracy would raise citi-
zens’ levels of trust in political parties (Leduc, 2001; 
Scarrow, Webb, & Farrell, 2000). 
The Europarties were asked to make known which 
candidate they supported for the presidency, and na-
tional member parties were expected to inform voters 
about that candidate during the campaign. Survey re-
search shows that a majority of respondents would be 
more inclined to vote in European elections if parties 
proposed a candidate for the function of European 
Commission President (European Commission, 2013). 
As it was the first time that Europarties organized 
candidate selection, this was a rather unique and in-
teresting research opportunity. Europarties started 
from a blank slate, and were free to design their selec-
tion procedure of choice. However, literature states 
that the decision to choose a particular procedure is 
determined by normative and institutional factors, 
such as the electoral system, legal requirements, and 
territorial divisions (Lundell, 2004; Scarrow et al., 2000; 
Shomer, 2014). But what is even more important in this 
context is the very specific organizational nature of 
parties at the EU level. Europarties are federated or-
ganizations: they consist of various separate member 
parties at the national level, amalgamated into Euro-
pean party organizations. Each national member party 
has its own internal rules, including rules with regard to 
the selection of candidates for the European Parlia-
ment. The applied procedures by the different Euro-
parties will be explained in detail in this section.  
4.1. European People’s Party (EPP) 
Historically, the European People’s Party (EPP) emerged 
from “diverse forms of cooperation that had long exist-
ed among Christian democrats in Western Europe” and 
was officially founded in 1976 in the run up to the first 
European Parliament elections of 1979 (Hanley, 2008; 
Jansen & Van Hecke, 2011, p. 3). Although initially estab-
lished by Christian democratic parties, the EPP later in-
cluded conservative and center-right parties. Since 1999 
it has the largest group in the European Parliament and 
it also holds major positions in the EC and the European 
Council, including the presidency. 
The EPP decided on its candidate selection proce-
dure during the Meise summit in December 2013. On 
this occasion, the party drew up a timeline for the se-
lection of an EPP candidate that would best represent 
the party’s values while having strong prospects of 
reaching a wide consensus in the European Council 
(which had to propose a candidate to the EP). 
Concerning the candidacy dimension, the EPP stipu-
lated that for a candidate to be nominated, he/she has 
to be affiliated to and supported by a national member 
party. Moreover, candidates need the endorsement of 
a maximum of two member parties from two EU coun-
tries other than the country of origin. On top of that, 
only presidents and secretary generals of ordinary 
member parties are entitled to nominate and/or en-
dorse a candidate (European People’s Party, 2014). The 
support of three parties was deliberately chosen as to 
avoid a race between the candidates to have the sup-
port of as many member parties as possible, like the 
ALDE for instance (L. Vandeputte, personal communi-
cation, November 14, 2014). The EPP equally wanted 
to avoid one candidate, since then it would become 
clear where he/she lacks support, as was the case with 
the PES and British Labour, for instance (K. Sas-
matzoglou, personal communication, October 9, 2014). 
By the closure of the candidate submission process, 
two candidates had submitted their candidacy: Jean-
Claude Juncker and Michel Barnier. The candidacy of 
Jean-Claude Juncker, former prime minister of Luxem-
bourg as well as the Eurogroup, was backed by his own 
Christian Social People’s party (CSV), the German CDU 
and the Greek Nea Demokratia. In addition, Michel 
Barnier, the incumbent European commissioner for in-
ternal market and services, received the support of his 
home party UMP, and the endorsement of the Hungar-
ian Fidesz and the Slovenian NSi member parties. As a 
next step in the procedure, the two candidacies were 
reviewed and validated during the EPP Political Assem-
bly, which was part of the overall program of the EPP 
Electoral Congress. 
Candidacies were subjected to a delegates’ vote 
during the EPP Electoral Congress. The candidate that 
received the absolute majority of valid votes would be 
declared elected. Abstentions were not considered val-
id votes. The final result of 828 delegates with voting 
rights was as follows: from the 627 votes cast, 382 
votes went to Juncker (61%) and 245 went in favor of 
Barnier (39%) (Cerulus, 2014). Juncker greatly benefit-
ted from the German delegation led by Angela Merkel, 
giving him the full backing of their total of 101 votes. 
Barnier, on the other hand, led a very active internal 
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campaign to mobilize the votes of those delegates that 
appeared to be disenchanted with the dominance of 
the German Christian Democrats within the EPP. 
The list of persons holding voting rights during the 
EPP Political Assembly is relatively extensive. Among 
these 828 EPP delegates, which represent the selec-
torate in the selection procedure, are the members of 
the EPP presidency, presidents and delegates of mem-
ber parties and associations, heads of state and gov-
ernment of EU member states, and presidents of other 
European institutions (e.g. European Council, Council 
of Europe, and Committee of the Regions) that are af-
filiated with national member parties. The EPP’s selec-
torate falls into the category of selected party agencies 
that usually take the form of conventions, conferences, 
or assemblies (Kenig, 2009, p. 436). The size of this cat-
egory of selectorates typically ranges from a few hun-
dred to sometimes over a thousand delegates selecting 
candidates or party leaders. 
4.2. Party of European Socialists (PES) 
The PES is the European level political family that as-
sembles the Socialist, Social Democratic, and Labour 
parties of the EU under one umbrella. At the time of 
the selection, there were 33 full member parties 
spread across all 28 EU Member States and Norway. 
The PES also included 5 full member organizations (e.g. 
the PES Women), 12 associate and 10 observer parties. 
In recent decades, the PES has been the main rival of 
the EPP in the wider European political landscape. The 
PES also enjoys a strong representation in various EU 
institutions.  
Already in 2010, the PES Council took the unani-
mous decision to set up a democratic and transparent 
process for designating the PES candidate for the Euro-
pean Commission Presidency (Party of European Social-
ists, 2010). A special ‘Working Group Common Candi-
date 2014’ was set up to this end (M. Laffeber, 
personal communication, September 15, 2014). During 
the 2009 elections, PES lacked a strong figurehead, 
which was in stark contrast to the rivaling EPP with 
Barroso as the lead candidate during the election cam-
paign. The early adoption of candidate selection pro-
cedures for the 2014 elections demonstrated the PES’ 
willingness to increase the party’s visibility through the 
personalization of EU politics. 
To stand as a legitimate candidate, PES formulated 
the following nomination criteria: nomination by a PES 
full member party or organization and support of 15% 
of PES full member parties or organizations, including 
their own party. Furthermore, a member party can on-
ly support one potential candidate. Given that the PES 
was composed of 32 full member parties within the EU 
and 5 full member organizations, a candidate had to 
come up with the support of a minimum of 6 parties or 
organizations in order to reach the 15% stipulated, i.e. 
one nominating her/him with 5 others supporting the 
nomination. 
After the candidacy submission deadline, the PES 
presidency convened to check and validate the candi-
dacies in order to draft a public list of potential candi-
dates (PES, 2013). On this occasion, an electoral com-
mittee made up of representatives for each of the 
prospective candidates was also established in order to 
guarantee fairness. Because of the high candidacy re-
quirements, Martin Schulz, incumbent president of the 
EP and member of the German SPD, emerged as the 
sole candidate for the PES. He obtained the support of 
22 of the 32 PES member parties (Mahony, 2013), 
which made it very difficult for potential opponents to 
meet the nomination criteria. Once the nomination 
process was over, each member party and organization 
organized internal decision-making procedures to ei-
ther support or reject Schulz’ potential designation as 
the common PES candidate. To consolidate this vote at 
the European level, a weighting of the votes took place 
for each full member party and organization. 
To conclude the overall process, the PES convened 
an Electoral Congress to ratify its candidate and adopt 
the party’s common manifesto for a pan-EU campaign. 
During this congress where 405 delegates were eligible 
to cast their vote, Martin Schulz was confirmed as PES 
common candidate with 368 voting in his favor, 2 op-
posing and 34 abstentions (from, among others, the 
British Labour party). 
4.3. Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Party 
(ALDE) 
In the run-up to the 2014 European elections, ALDE 
was composed of 57 member parties. The liberal Euro-
party is traditionally considered the third largest group 
in the European Parliament. The relatively small chance 
of beating EPP or PES in numbers did not stop ALDE 
from launching its own candidate selection procedure 
for the EC presidency. In this procedure, all delegates 
could vote, unlike the election of the ALDE president. 
Delegates that were not present could vote online in 
advance. Candidates had to be formally nominated by 
at least two member parties from more than one 
member state or by 20% of ALDE Party Congress voting 
delegates (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Eu-
rope Party, 2013a). Surprisingly, candidates did not 
need the support of their own party (J. Moroza-
Rasmussen, personal communication, November 4, 
2014). During the nomination process, two candidates 
came forward: the incumbent Economic and Monetary 
Affairs Commissioner Olli Rehn, supported by 14—
mostly Nordic—member parties, and former Belgian 
Prime Minister and ALDE EP Group leader Guy Verhof-
stadt, nominated by the liberal parties of the Benelux 
(ALDE, 2013b; Cerulus, 2013). This is a consequence of 
the intra-party divisions that characterize the liberal 
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party: the ALDE group is a cooperation of two separate 
Europarties—the European Democratic Party (EDP) and 
the Liberals—and has the widest range of policy posi-
tions among its member parties (McElroy & Benoit, 
2011, pp. 162-164). To avoid an open conflict between 
the different factions—the EDP threatened to leave the 
EP group if Olli Rehn would become the ALDE candi-
date—two mediators were appointed: Dutch prime 
minister Mark Rutte and Christian Lindner of the Ger-
man FDP. They managed to make both nominees come 
to an agreement: Verhofstadt would be the ALDE can-
didate for the EC presidency and Rehn for one of the 
other senior positions in the EU (ALDE, 2014).  
As a result, it was no longer necessary to organize a 
competitive procedure to determine the ALDE candi-
date. Participants at the ALDE Electoral Congress could 
simply approve or disapprove the agreement. The se-
lectorate consisted of 32 member party delegations 
each entitled to a number of votes depending on the 
number of seats their party has in its national parlia-
ment. Of the 388 delegates, 245 approved the com-
promise in Verhofstadt’s favor (79.3%), 44 disapproved 
(14.2%), and 20 delegates abstained (6.5%). 
4.4. The European Green Party (EGP) 
The EGP is a pan-European party bringing together 
Green parties from across EU member states as well as 
non-EU countries. The candidate selection procedure 
proposed by the EGP Committee was adopted by the 
EGP Council composed of all Green member parties. Ac-
cording to this procedure, any European Green politician 
with the ambition to run as the leading EGP candidate 
needs to be nominated by his/her national party and re-
ceive the support from at least four to a maximum of 
eight of the 33 EGP member parties (European Green 
Party, 2013). Moreover, all EU member parties have the 
right to exclusively support one candidate. After en-
dorsements from the EGP member parties, four nomi-
nees (i.e. José Bové, Ska Keller, Rebecca Harms, and 
Monica Frassoni) were confirmed as EGP contenders. 
Afterwards, these four contenders participated in 
an online open primary election. This first of its kind 
online ‘Green Primary’ increased the visibility of the 
EGP giving it an upbeat image while capturing the pub-
lic’s interest with its e-democracy project (J. Cremers, 
personal communication, September 12, 2014). A cen-
tral priority of the EGP throughout this campaign was to 
emphasize the importance of more inclusive and partici-
patory decision-making in the EU. All EU citizens, EGP 
supporters and sympathizers, were invited to take part 
in this online voting exercise, with the end goal of select-
ing two final figureheads to lead the EGP campaign. 
The reasons for selecting two lead candidates are 
twofold. First, this stems from the EGP’s conviction 
that leadership should be shared by two or more per-
sons and not narrowed down to one person alone. 
Secondly, the party firmly believes that both male and 
female should be represented in power and decision-
making structures. This online selection procedure also 
reflects other EGP values: democracy, participation and 
inclusiveness, but also a high level of accessibility ena-
bling as many people as possible to become involved. 
The EGP also opens the way to participation in the 
online voting procedure for younger citizens (i.e. as early 
as the age of 16). A total of 22,676 persons from all 
Member States voted, which led to the following results: 
11,791 votes for Ska Keller; 11,726 for José Bové; 8,170 
for Rebecca Harms and 5,851 for Monica Frassoni. As a 
result, Keller and Bové formed the duo to lead the Greens 
through the ins and outs of the 2014 EP elections.  
4.5. Party of European Left (EL) 
The EL was founded in 2004, in the run-up to the 2014 
European Parliament elections. It has left-wing, (former) 
communist and socialist parties from various European 
countries as its members. Unlike the EPP and the PES, 
and much more so than ALDE and the EGP, the party 
suffers from geographical and electoral imbalances. 
Most of its member parties have no or little representa-
tion in a national parliament, except for the German Die 
Linke and the Greek Syriza (Coalition of the Radical Left). 
Moreover, it is much smaller than the other Europarties. 
Therefore the opportunity was taken to choose its own 
Spitzenkandidat in order to present the EL to a wider 
audience. The decision was made by the Council of 
Chairpersons, the main decision-making body, at its 
meeting in Madrid in October 2013. Alexis Tsipras, pres-
ident of Syriza and vice-president of EL, was the only 
candidate. After being confirmed by the Council—not 
unanimously but by consensus—he was presented to 
the Congress in December 2013. Every member party 
had 12 delegates; 164 delegates took part in the vote. 
84.15% voted in favor, 7.32% against, and 8.54% ab-
stained (European Left, 2013). The main point of discus-
sion was clearly not Tsipras but whether his candidacy 
implicitly legitimized the EU’s political and institutional 
set-up that the EL strongly criticizes. 
5. A Comparison of Europarties’ Selection Procedures 
This section highlights the similarities and differences 
between the various candidate selection procedures 
applied by Europarties in nominating candidates for 
Commission Presidency. More specifically, we analyze 
the four dimensions of candidate selection discussed 
earlier in the theoretical section of this article. Table 1 
facilitates the comparison of procedures by summariz-
ing the most important characteristics for each candi-
date selection dimension. This comparison allows us to 
confirm or reject the four hypotheses formulated earli-
er based on the Europarties’ decision-making proce-
dures and practices. 
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Table 1. Comparison of Europarties’ Candidate Selection Procedures: Analytical Dimensions and Outcome. Source: Par-
ty statutes, internal regulations and interviews (see Appendix). 
 EPP PES ALDE EGP EL 
Candidacy Support by 
national member 
party + max. two 
foreign member 
parties 
Support by 15% of 
full member 
parties (incl. own 
party or other 
party from own 
country) 
Support by at least 
two member 
parties (from 
different countries) 
or 20% of congress 
delegates 
Support by at least 
four and max. eight 
member parties 
Support by 
national party 
president and the 
Council of 
Chairpersons 
Selectorate 828 EPP delegates 
at electoral 
congress 
405 PES delegates 
at electoral 
congress 
388 ALDE delegates 
at electoral 
congress 
EU citizens above 
the age of 16 
164 EL delegates at 
electoral congress 
Decentralization Number of votes 
for member 
parties: three + 
number depending 
on result in last 
European election 
Number of votes 
for member parties 
based on 
combination of 
party strength in 
national 
parliament, 
European 
parliament and 
country size 
Number of votes 
for member party 
delegations 
depends on party 
strength in national 
parliaments 
One man one 
vote—no weights 
for member parties 
or countries 
12 votes each 
member party 
Voting or appointment 
procedures 
Absolute majority 
of valid votes by 
EPP delegates 
(abstentions not 
valid) 
Qualified majority 
of valid votes by 
PES delegates  
Absolute majority 
of valid votes by 
ALDE delegates (in 
two rounds if 
necessary) 
Relative majority of 
selectorate; two 
winning candidates 
cannot be of same 
sex or member 
state  
Voting procedure, 
but not stipulated 
Outcome Jean-Claude 
Juncker 
Michel Barnier 
Valdis 
Dombrovskis* 
Martin Schulz 
 
Guy Verhofstadt 
Olli Rehn* 
José Bové 
Ska Keller 
Monica Frassoni 
Rebecca Harms 
Alexis Tsipras 
 
Note: Candidates in bold are the selected Spitzenkandidaten. Candidates with an asterisk withdrew their candidacy be-
fore selection took place. 
First, candidacy requirements do not show great varia-
tion among the various Europarties’ selection proce-
dures. In general, all parties require their nominees to 
be party members with some additional requirements 
(Hazan & Rahat, 2010). More specifically, apart from 
affiliation to one’s own national member party, nomi-
nees are also required to gain the support of a defined 
set of other member parties and organizations. The EL 
is the outlier here, as the candidate needs to be put 
forward by its national party president. Among the 
other Europarties, there are, however, differences in 
the degree of strictness in their additional ‘transna-
tional’ requirements. The PES clearly applies the strict-
est procedure, where nominees are expected to gather 
the support of no less than 15% of the other member 
parties. This resulted in a candidate selection process 
lacking intra-party competition, as only Schulz suc-
ceeded in gaining sufficient endorsement within the 
PES party organization. In addition, formal candidacy 
criteria do not mention any requirements with regard 
to candidates’ personal qualities or experience. In prac-
tice, however, the various party nominees can be con-
sidered seasoned heavyweight politicians, with some 
of them having a background as former prime minis-
ters. In sum, while some variation exists in terms of the 
required member parties’ support, the candidacy re-
quirements do not differ significantly from one anoth-
er, which confirms the first hypothesis, with the EL as 
an exception. 
Second, with regard to the nature of the selectorate, 
the EGP clearly stands out when compared to the other 
Europarties. This confirms the second hypothesis, which 
stated that the EGP selectorate would be more inclusive 
compared with the other selectorates. Indeed, the 
Greens organized an extremely inclusive selection pro-
cedure where all voters and citizens older than 16 were 
eligible to participate online. Self-evidently, this prima-
ry election is located at the extreme inclusive end of 
the inclusiveness–exclusiveness continuum. The other 
four Europarties each organized party conferences to 
select the final candidate for EC presidency. These par-
ty agencies were composed of party delegates in the 
cases of PES, ALDE and EL, and additionally high-level 
intra-party officeholders in the case of EPP. In other 
words, selectorates of these four parties are situated 
towards the more exclusive end of the continuum 
when compared to the EGP procedure. The PES selec-
torate is probably even more exclusive than the ALDE, 
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EPP and EL procedures, since the formal PES procedure 
requires nominees to be checked and validated first by 
the PES presidency before presenting candidates to the 
wider selectorate. 
Third, the level of decentralization in Europarties’ 
candidate selection processes has to be measured by 
the influence of national member parties. Analogous to 
the selectorate dimension, the EGP’s selection proce-
dure differs substantially in terms of decentralization. 
More specifically, the online primary election did not 
take into account any demographic balances, making it 
a comparatively more centralized candidate selection 
procedure than the ones organized by EL, PES, ALDE 
and EPP. Within EL every member party counts equally 
while the latter three parties take the members states’ 
demographic weight in their delegate conferences into 
account. This makes the final step of the selection pro-
cess fairly decentralized in nature. On the other hand, 
none of the analyzed candidate selection procedures 
allows for individual member parties to nominate EC 
presidency candidates unilaterally. As discussed earlier, 
candidacies always have to be supported by a number 
of member parties and organizations, which decreases 
the decentralized nature of candidate selection proce-
dures. As a consequence, the results show that the 
third hypothesis should be rejected: the level of decen-
tralization is substantially lower within the EGP com-
pared to the other Europarties. 
Fourth and lastly, not only the EPP but all five Euro-
parties opted for voting procedures rather than ap-
pointment systems to nominate their candidates. By 
applying voting systems, the parties have deliberately 
chosen reduced representational control: there is no 
need for general consensus on the selected candidates 
among selectors (Hazan & Rahat, 2010). Therefore our 
last hypothesis is rejected. It should be noted, howev-
er, that only within the EPP and the EGP voters had a 
clear choice between different candidates. All parties 
tried to create a balance between encouraging internal 
debate and sending a unified message to the outside 
world. Clearly, by having two candidates that almost 
split the whole Europarty, ALDE took the riskiest path 
but eventually opted for the safe road. 
6. Conclusion 
This article analyzed the selection procedures of 
Spitzenkandidaten in the 2014 European Parliament 
(EP) elections as designed and executed by the Euro-
pean People’s Party (EPP), the Party of European So-
cialists (PES), the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for 
Europe Party (ALDE), the European Green Party (EGP), 
and the Party of the European Left (EL). The choice of 
Spitzenkandidaten was a relatively groundbreaking 
process as it was the first form of political recruitment 
organized at the EU level. This made the 2014 EP elec-
tions different from previous ones, as these candidates 
organized a Europe-wide campaign and voters had the 
possibility to take the profile and the program of the EC 
presidency candidates—the choice for Spitzenkandi-
daten—into account when going to the polls.  
All Europarties had to start from scratch, since 
there was no tradition to lean upon (J. Moroza-
Rasmussen, personal communication, November 4, 
2014). They had to invent something (J. Cremers, per-
sonal communication, September 12, 2014; L. 
Vandeputte, personal communication, November 14, 
2014) so the easiest and least time consuming way to 
solve this problem was to copy-paste existing proce-
dures, particularly the ones to elect a Europarty presi-
dent, applying the same majority rule, the same dele-
gates voting, etc. As a result, the novel candidate 
selection procedures for the selection of the EC presi-
dency candidate were strongly inspired by already ex-
isting decision-making practices of Europarties.  
Even though doubts exist as to whether the 
Spitzenkandidaten were able to reinforce the link be-
tween the EP elections and the EC president (Hobolt, 
2014), Europarties embraced the new selection process 
as a means of strengthening their position at the EU 
level. This is not to say that the procedures cannot be 
improved (L. Vandeputte, personal communication, 
November 14, 2014). Europarties have to evaluate the 
process and the outcome. One has to bear in mind that 
the selection procedures were set up at a moment 
when the Europarties did not have any guarantees that 
the candidate of the largest party would actually be-
come the head of the EC. Many government leaders 
considered the nomination of the EC president the pre-
rogative of the European Council and remained skepti-
cal of the entire process even after the European elec-
tions had already taken place. Only because the 
Europarties themselves had built up momentum 
around the Spitzenkandidaten process and the Europe-
an Parliament had put pressure on the heads of state 
and government in the direct aftermath of the elec-
tions, EPP candidate Jean-Claude Juncker was nomi-
nated by the European Council and subsequently 
elected by the Parliament as the new EC president. This 
can explain why the procedures were put in place rela-
tively late and in line with existing party practices.  
Despite several shortcomings it is clear that the 
Spitzenkandidaten set a precedent for the 2019 elec-
tions (M. Laffeber, personal communication, Septem-
ber 15, 2014). On the 11th of November 2015, the Eu-
ropean Parliament adopted a text for the reform of the 
electoral law of the EU, which demonstrates that the 
Spitzenkandidaten process will become an indispensa-
ble aspect of the 2019 election campaign. The Parlia-
ment urges the Europarties to nominate their candi-
dates for the EC presidency at least 12 weeks before 
the elections and to establish democratic and trans-
parent procedures to select the candidates. Further-
more, it encourages the member states to facilitate the 
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participation of the Europarties and their lead candi-
dates in electoral campaigns and in the media (Europe-
an Parliament, 2015). As a consequence, we expect 
that the Europarties will further professionalize their 
selection procedures and start the process earlier with 
more high profile politicians standing as candidates in 
order to maximize public and media attention. In this 
way, the 2014 EP elections might prove to be a game 
changer in the role played by Europarties and their in-
fluence on the inter-institutional balance within the EU. 
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